Press Notice
UK Councils Against Fluoridation
04/08/05

Contact:
Liz Vaughan
Information Officer
UK Councils Against Fluoridation
01229 885420

Following is a letter sent out by UK Councils Against Fluoridation to Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO) regarding a response to letter of concern from UKCAF.

For over six months, UKCAF has been attempting to discuss potential problems with roadway transportation of hexafluorosilicic acid, and the potential of terrorists hijacking lorry loads of hexafluorosilicic acid and other dangerous goods being transported via UK roads and motorways. APCO flatly refused to even read and view materials sent to them much less attend a meeting.
http://www.aar.org/GetFile.asp?File_ID=697
http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov/JPODOCS/REPTS_TE/14095_files/sec_1.htm
http://www.pesticidesafety.uiuc.edu/newsletter/html/200401a.html
http://www.construction.com/NewsCenter/Headlines/ENR/20030922d.asp
http://whitepapers.silicon.com/0,39024759,60123902p-39001183q,00.htm

While, UKCAF has communicated with both the Fire Brigade Union and the Transport and General Workers Union, the police have refused to engage in dialogue.

At present, both UKCAF, National Pure Water Association (NPWA) and the Transportation and General Workers Union have concerns about the fact that lorry Hazardous Materials (HazMat) driving licences can illegally purchased over the Internet (see UKCAF letter below). And that HazMat haulage companies can be sold and the operators' licence is simply transferred to the new owner - this has been a concern communicated to government by Transportation and General since the height of IRA terrorists activities and is still an un-rectified security problem in the UK.

Hazardous materials transported via lorry on a daily basis poses a more significant threat than imported WMD and are readily available to terrorists who have illegal HazMat licences.

UKCAF and NPWA are also concerned about security at drinking water treatment facilities. A terrorists doesn't need to go to the trouble of making a chemical agent in some dingy back room or importing a truck-load of some bacterial agent, they can simply use chemicals present at many water treatment facilities. See:
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS21026_02072002.pdf
http://www.ems.org/chemical_plants/facts.html
http://www.cpeo.org/lists/military/2003/msg00662.html

However, hexafluorosilicic acid is the most effective poison to debilitate a population and is readily available at facilities that fluoridate.

In the United States, hexafluorosilicic acid has been on the list of hazardous materials that terrorists would use in place of WMD, but the UK government seems to be oblivious to this fact. This is possibly because the Department of Health has been telling everyone that the acid is virtually non-toxic. It seems that the government believes its own fabricated
propaganda which can be very dangerous at this point in time because it puts peoples lives at risk.

In light of information shared with NPWA and UKCAF by the Transport and General Woprkers Union, both organisations are extremely concerned about the security of UK drinking water and the transportation of hazardous materials in general.

NPWA/UKCAF research on the subjects of hazardous materials transportation and water treatment security in the UK came up with a blank. However, the police and fire brigade management tell us "not to worry" because they have everything in hand - they have "contingency plans", but they haven't told us what they are which is not very comforting.

With regard to hexafluorosilicic acid, The ACPO has told UKCAF that they were overstating the case, however, if you would like to find out just how dangerous this chemical is, respond to this email with your name and address and we will send you the comprehensive PowerPoint presentation - "H2SiF6: The Element of Risk."

***************
Mr Keith Bailey
ACPO Road Policing Policy Officer,
Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern
Ireland
23 Victoria Street
London. SW1 0EX

29th July 2005

Dear Mr Bailey,

I apologise for omitting the date from my letter to you, and will overlook the two month delay in your response.

The information supplied to you by ACPO staff is neither accurate nor up to date - as you would realise if you had looked at the material I sent you.

The inaccurate information on which you have based your reply to me renders it virtually meaningless in the light of the information I provided for you, and damages the credibility of the Association of Chief Police Officers. I find it extremely troubling that your sources of information on Dangerous Goods are so inadequate.

Regarding spills/accidents:

1. 26 April 2001 a 'Major Incident' involving hexafluorosilicic acid shut down the Port of Bristol at Avonmouth for nearly thirty hours.
2. February 2005, there was an incident in Phoenix Arizona involving approximately 110 gallons of hexafluorosilicic acid. Almost 10,000 people were notified to seek indoor shelter and 11 policeman and several firemen were sent to hospital.
3. Baltimore, Maryland, 2001 - there was a major train fire at in the Howard Street Tunnel. Two tank cars carried hexafluorosilicic acid:
http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov/JPODOCS/REPTS_TE/13780.html
"Baltimore, Maryland, July 18, 2001 - rail tunnel fire MDE requests consulting chemist assistance through South Baltimore Industrial Mutual Aid Plan (SBIMAP). MDE advises Baltimore City HazMat of potential hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor hazard due to thermal degradation of fluorosilicic acid; identifies specialized treatment needed for HF exposures."

In fact, there have been numerous accidents and near-misses with fluoride chemicals in transit that ACPO investigators seem to be unaware of - or to have omitted from the information they supplied to you.

Regarding the nature of hexafluorosilicic acid:

As described in your information, hexafluorosilicic acid has been seriously underestimated. If anyone from the UK had contacted, for instance, the New York City Police or US Department of Homeland Security, they would have found a more realistic assessment of the risk hexafluorosilicic acid poses.

The acid is high on the US list of Dangerous Goods that terrorists might hijack in order to cause mass injury. Terrorists don't need to make chemical agents: any amateur can hijack a tanker of any fluoride acid or any othe toxicant or flamable and do far greater damage with
that than was caused by the recent London bombings.

The following article excerpt appeared in the New Yorker magazine on 25th of July 2005.

THE TERRORISM BEAT.
HOW IS THE NYPD DEFENDING THE CITY?
by William Finnigan. Staff writer.

Says Asst Chief P T Pulaski, a commanding officer in the counter-terrorism bureau... "A tanker truck collision, a spill, it's an accident anywhere in the country but not here in New York City. Our intel shows that Al Qaeda's instructions to its people are 'Get your hazmat license, get your tanker truck license, and we will use them as weapons."

In the US, companies transporting hexafluorosilicic acid are required to notify the police department of the route to be taken and the driver's details - in stark contrast to the attitude of the UK Association of Chief Police Officers.

The American Water Works Association has also issued security advice to water treatment plant operators regarding hexafluorosilicic acid, because terrorists could poison the whole population of a city by taking over a water treatment plant and increasing the concentration of fluoride in the water put into supply.

To my knowledge, this possibility has not been considered in the UK. They don't have to import the chemicals - they are readily available at the treatment facilities.

UKCAF has looked for UK security measures applicable to water treatment plants and there seem to be none of any substance.

From the information presented to you by ACPO staff and HSE, they would appear to be completely unaware of any security risk presented by the transportation of these products, or their use in often isolated and unmanned water treatment plants.

Another troubling dimension to this situation has been raised by our contacts in the Transport and General Workers Union. With their Edinburgh based transport consultants they have complained to the Minister for Transport about the advertising on the internet of
Dangerous Goods Hazmat licences for sale, which of course is illegal.

There is also the corrupt selling of operator licences.

We understand there was concern in the Union that the operator licences were being sold when the problems with the IRA were at their most serious.

Apparently, nothing has been done by governemnt to rectify the situation.

It seems that, in the UK, anyone can purchase a haulage company which holds the relevent HazMat licence and that licence will simply be transferred to the new owner.

If the new owner had terrorist activities in mind, they would only need to hire drivers with illegal 'Hazmat licences' and wait for the most toxic or explosive consignment(s) to come through, so that they could be diverted to highly populated areas.

Alternatively a suicide bomber could simply obtain a Hazmat licence on the internet as Al'Queda recommends and find himself a job driving a tanker and wait for the right consignment.

There could well be a scenario similar to 9/11 in place, where the action is choreographed to do the most damage.

Given the lethal potential of hexafluorosilicic acid in bulk, these are possibilities that UK police forces should be aware of. I do trust you will now give this urgent matter more focussed attention?

Before replying, I would suggest that you view the CD-ROM "The Element of Risk" and read the "UKCAF Dangerous Goods Advisory Notice" which I
sent you.
Yours sincerely,

Cllr Liz Vaughan
Information Officer
UK Councils Against Fluoridation

cc.
Sir Ian Blair.
Commissioner, Metropolitan Police

Rt. Hon. Jack Straw, MP
Foreign Secretary